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IN RE CARMEN 
C.Zd 851; 313 P.2d 817] 
5667. In Bank. 2, 
Kil 
RAYNA 'l'Ol\1 
of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of 
of 
the trial court's determination 
u"""'""''V·" on basis of new and additional 
appear in the trial court record. 
Id.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.-
the on habeas corpus has been limited 
appearing on the face of the record 
and no evidence dehors the record has been received to im-
the judgment, though the scope of inquiry has been 
extended to embrace additional evidence in instances where 
contested the validity of a final judgment of con-
on the that he had been denied the aid of 
that conviction had been secured solely by per-
stitutional. 
used by prosecuting officials, or 
he had been convicted was uncon-
Id.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.-
from the traditional scope of inquiry on habeas 
as to permit consideration of new and additional 
do not appear in the trial court record, is not war-
ranted where petitioner's claims of lack of jurisdiction are 
on federal statutes, the effect of which has been 
"""u'"'u since petitioner committed his offenses, by legislation 
the courts of this state unquestioned jurisdiction over 
vutm"'"' committed in "All Indian country within the State." 
u.s.c. § 1162.) 
of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.-
had opportunity to raise a jurisdictional 
presenting the alleged facts at his trial, but he 
to do so and, on the facts there alleged and proved, the 
trial court's implied determination that it had jurisdiction 
was he cannot relitigate that issue on habeas corpus. 
[5] Criminal Law- Jurisdiction.- Federal jurisdiction over of-
fenses committed within the state, which offenses are defined 
state law, is exceptional and, in trials in the courts in this 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus,§ 17; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, 
27. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Habeas Corpus,§ 10; [5] Criminal 
Law,§ 76. 
[ 48 C.2(l 
defensive 
matter. 
PROCEEDING m habeas corpus to secure release from 
t~u:si Writ denied. 
lVfason A. Bailey and Leonard ,J. Bloom for Petitimwr. 
Edmuud CL Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy At~ 
for Respondent. 
SPENCE, ,J .·-l'etitioHer, Hayna 'l'om Carmen, is eonfined 
in the state prison at San Quentin under judgments of eon-
viction of first degree murder and of assault with intent to 
eommit murder. He seeks his release from custody upon 
alleged jurisdictional grounds. 
Petitioner was first convicted of the two offenses in the 
Superior Court of l\Iadera County in 1950. Wilbur Dan 
MeS1Yain was the victim of the murder and Alvin McSwain 
was the vietim of the assault. The crimes were committed 
neat· the home of the victims. The initial altercation between 
the parties had occurred earlier the same morning at a point 
in Madera County ~ome miles distant from the scene of the 
erimes. After that altercation petitioner had driven to his 
home, had obtained a gun, and had then driven to the home 
of 1 he vietims to await their return. The shooting occurred 
immediately following their return, while Alvin MeSwain was 
still in an automobile and ·wilbur Dan McSwain was standing 
ncar it. 
At the first trial it was alleged and proved that the crimes 
had been committed in Madera County. Petitioner was con-
vieted of both offenses and was sentenced to imprisonment for 
the term prescribed by law on the assault count and to suffer 
the death penalty on the murder count. Upon appeal, this 
court affirmed the assault conviction and reversed the murder 
eonviction. (People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768 [228 P.2d 
. ) 
At the second trial in the Superior Court of Madera 
petitioner was again convicted of first degree murder 
for the killing of Wilbur· Dan MeSwain and was again 
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. It was again alleged 
and proved that the murder had been eommitted in Madera 
County. 
At the time of oral argument before this eourt on the appeal 
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from the second murder conviction, it was suggested for the 
first time that facts might be adduced showing that the 
murder had been committed on a small tract of land within 
Madera County known as an "Indian allotment," that such 
allotment constituted "Indian country," and that petitioner 
was an ''Indian,'' within the meaning of those terms as used in 
certain federal statutes, with the result that exclusive juris-
diction over the offense might be vested in the federal courts. 
(See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242, as amended 
May 24, 1949.) Petitioner thereupon filed an application to 
produce on the appeal additional evidence relating to the 
newly suggested facts. This court denied the application and 
affirmed the second judgment of conviction. (People v. 
Carmen, 43 Cal.2d 342 [273 P.2d 521].) Noting that the 
facts shown in the trial court record were insufficient to show 
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, this court stated 
that "Since the defendant committed the crime in a county 
of this state, it may not be assumed that any special circum-
stances existed ·which would deprive the state of jurisdiction.'' 
(P. 349.) 
Thereafter petitioner commenced this habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, claiming a lack of jurisdiction in the courts of this 
state on the basis of allegations that he and the :M:cSwains were 
"Indians" and that the murder and the assault had been 
committed in ''Indian country.'' Because o£ the alleged 
jurisdictional questions involved, this court issued a writ of 
habeas corpus and made an order of reference for the purpose 
of determining the status of petitioner and Wilbur Dan Mc-
Swain, as well as the locus of the crimes. Hearings were 
conducted and the referee filed his findings with this court. 
The People contend that the evidence is insufficient to sus-
tain the referee's findings concerning the status of petitioner 
and Wilbur Dan McSwain. Upon further consideration, how-
ever, we have concluded that it is unnecessary to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the referee's findings or 
the adequacy of said findings. [1] We have reached this 
conclusion because we are of the opinion that in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances, which are not present here, 
petitioner may not contest, in this collateral attack upon the 
final judgments of conviction, the trial court's determination 
and exercise of jurisdiction, upon the basis of new and addi-
tional facts which do not appear in the trial court record. 
[2] We are here concerned with the nature of the inquiry 
which may be made on habeas corpus where it is claimed that 
trial <'<mrt of 
P.2d In rc 
544] In rc Murphy, 79 Cal.App. 
Ballas, 53 Cal.App. 109 [199 P. 
496 P. 790]; see also 39 
456. However, it was said in In rc Connor, 
712 fJ08 P.2d 10], that " he scope 
rorpus in this state may ... nnder 
exttmd over the entire eonrse of in 
courts ... and may embrace additional evidence 
this court either directly or under an order of referenc~e." 
The scope of inquiry has been so extended in instances where 
a petitioner has contested the validity of a final of 
conviction npon the ground that he had been denied the aiel 
of counsel (In re Connor·, snpra, 16 Cal.2d 701) ; or that his 
eon victior1 had been secured solely perjured 
knowingly used by prosecnting officials (In re 
2d 1 [73 P.2d 554]) ; or that the law nuder vvhich he had been 
convicted was unconstitutional re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488 [122 
P.2d 22]). 
[3] The asserted grounds of c htimed lack of ict ion in 
the instant case, however, do not appear to be of stwh nature 
as would warrant a departure from the traditional scope 
inquiry or would permit the consideration of new and addi-
tional fads alleged by petitioner whieh do not appear in the 
trial eourt reeord. 'l'he sit nat ion here is one in 
whieh the asserted lack of jnrisrlietion is based npon H elaim 
b.'- petitioner that he 1ms eonvietcd of an uneomd:i-
tutiona1 law or was denied an_'IT fnndamental constitutional 
right. (See In 1"C Bell, supra, 19 Ca1.2d 501-502. On 
the eontrary, petitioner's claims are based 
eral statutes (18 U.S.C.A. l 
effeet of which has been changed sinee 
offenses, by legislation giving the eourts of this state unques-
tioned jurisdietion over offenses eommittcd in ''All I wlian 
country within the state." (18 § amended 
Aug. 24, 
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here involved by 
raise the 
the 
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upon the facts there He failed 
the court's determination 
over the offenses was correct. To 
now that issue would encourage 
with crimes, the jurisdiction over which 
upon factual determinations, to with-
of those issues until after they had attempted 
to obtain a favorable result at a trial on the and 
until such time as a conviction by the court claimed 
to have would be impossible by reason of the 
statute of limitations, or otherwise. (See Ex parte Wallace, 
81 Okla. Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205].) The sanction of 
such would permit piecemeal litigation of factual 
issues which should be finally determined upon a single trial. 
[5] Federal jurisdiction over offenses which are committed 
~within the boundaries of this state and which are defined by 
state law exceptional and, in trials in the courts of this state, 
such jurisdictional claims are ordinarily defensive matter. 
v. Collins, 105 CaL 504, 509 [39 P. 16].) Peti-
tioner therefore should have alleged and proved in the trial 
court any facts which he now claims might have had the 
effect of vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. 
The conclusions are supported by both state and 
federal authority. In Btate v. Utecht, 220 Minn. 431 [19 
N.W.2d 161 A.L.R. 1316], and Ex parte W allacc, S1tpra, 
81 Okla Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205], the problem presented was 
almost identical with that involved here. Petitioners therein 
collateral attack on habeas corpus attempted for the first 
time to contest the jurisdiction of the state courts of general 
which had convicted them. It was claimed that 
petitioners were ''Indians'' and that the crimes of which 
had been convicted had been committed in ''Indian 
country." Relief was denied in both cases upon the ground 
that the determination of jurisdiction by a trial court of gen-
eral jurisdiction was not subject to collateral attack on habeas 
corpus where petitioners had not contested the jurisdiction of 
the court at the trial nor brought to the trial court's attention 
facts from which lack of jurisdiction could have been deter-
mined, and where upon the face of the trial court record there 
was uo showing of lack of jurisdiction. (See also 39 C.J.S., 
Habeas Corpus, § 16, p. 456; 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, 
~ P~ 16].) While in neither of the cited cases did peti-
RG6 C.2d 
1 iOJwr attempt to raise the jurisdictional question upon appeal 
as was donP ill thP instant r:asP, the attempt as hereto-
fore was mlfiW'I'rssfnL l'ropln v. Car·men, supra, 4:l 
( 'al.2d >l-1:2.) That. f:wt.or, tlwrPfnt'P, would not apprar to he 
a tlisi i,o;hing: 'llH'. 
On nlnnerolls oceasions the federal l'OUrts have likewise 
held tlwt a final jwlgmeut of ,·onvidion may not be attacked 
on habeas corpus upon allegations of new and aclditional faets 
,•]aimed to show ihat the convicting court lacked 
oyer the offense because of the alleged status of the parties 
or the place where the crime was committed, at least 
whell there was no affirmative showing of lack of jurisdiction 
upon the face of the trial court record. (Toy 1'oy v. Hopkins, 
212 TJ.S. G42 [29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644]; Davis v. Johnston, 
144 F.2d 8G2; Hatten Hudspeth, 99 F.2d 501; Ex parte 
Sal'lt[Je, ] 58 F. 205 sec also Rodman v. Potht"er, 264 U.S. 399 
[44 S.Ct. :360, 68 L.Ed. 759]; In r-e Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178 [26 
S.Ct. 602, 50 hEd. 984]; Walsh v. Johnston, 115 :F'.2d 806; 
Walsh v. Archer, 7a F.2d 197; Archer v. Heath, :30 F.2d 932; 
United 8/alcs v. Lail', 19;) F. 47 [115 C.C.A. 49] .) 
Certain of the cited federal eases involved petitioners claim-
ing that tlw fr~deral eonrts which had r~onvieted them lacked 
jnrisdid im1 beeanse the petitioners therein were ''allotted 
Indians" and no longer wards of the government (Toy Toy v. 
Hopkins, supm E:r par·tc Savage, supra), or that the locus of 
the erimc was no longer "Indian country" (1'oy 1'oy v. 
Hopkins, supra: Davis v. Johnston, supra; Hatten v. Huds-
peth, In each instance the court refused to redeter-
mine the question of jurisdiction. Moreover, the refusal was 
not made dependent upon whether the jurisdictional issue had 
lwPH raised at the trial or whether at the time of trial peti-
tioner was aware of the facts upon which the alleged hek of 
jurisdiction was later asserted. Thus in Davis v. Johnston, 
supra, 144 F.2d 862, it was said: "In appellant's petition 
he states that lw did not object to the jurisdiction of the 
r•ourt in the trial of the criminal case for the reason, he 
now alleges that he was not aware of the fact that the store 
building in which the crime was committed was not within the 
reservation. 'l'hc decision of the court in the criminal case 
npon the factual t1ucstiou of jurisdiction is equally conclusive 
whether or not it was raised by the defendant." 
'rhe ease of 1'ooisgah v. United States, 186 ]'.2d 93, is not 
helpful to petitioner. There an Indian sought redetermination 
of the trial court's jurisdietion by a motion to vacate under 
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section United States Code Annotated. The 
court, one judge dissenting, reexamined the question of juris-
diction, found as a matter of law that it was lacking, and 
directed that the judgment be vacated. The court was careful, 
however, to distinguish two of the above cited eases, stating 
at pages 95-96: "Unlike Hatten v. 10 99 
F.2d 501, and Davis v. 9 144 F.2d 862, no new 
or additional facts 11 re into the case, 
and no afljndicatcd facif' are songht to be impeached." It 
appears dear from the quoted language that the case is 
likewise distingni:-;bab1r, sinee we determim~d on the second 
appeal (People v. supra, 43 Cal.2d 342) that there 
were no facts in the trial eourt reeord ·which showed lack of 
jurisdiction in the trial court. Petitioner's claim is therefore 
wholly dependent upon new and additional facts which he 
seeks to inject i uto this proceeding as the basis for his col-
lateral attack. 1Tnder the rule established by the numerous 
state and federal decisions, such collateral attack is not per-
mitted under the circumstances; and if there may be said to 
be anything in the opinions in State ex rel. Irvine v. District 
Court, 125 Mont. 308 f239 P.2d 2721, or Application of Andy, 
49 Wn.2c1 449 [302 P.2d 963/, which lends support to peti-
tioner's position, it is io that extent out of harmony with the 
rstablisbed rule and should not be followeil. 
The established rule was clarified but not modified in Bowen 
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 [59 S.Ct. 442, 83 !LEd. 455], 
where it was said that the traditional limitations on inquiry 
on habeas eorpus may, in some situations, ''yield to exceptional 
circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the 
writ of habeas corp11s is apparent." The court there deter-
mined that the important and unanswered conflict then exist-
ing between federal and state authorities concerning the 
purely legal question of their respective claims to jurisdiction 
over a national park constituted sneh '' exrrptional circum-
stances.'' 
The trial eourt reeord there showed that the murder had 
been committed "on the Government Reservation kllown as 
the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park within the 
exterior limits of the State of Georgia'' 21) ; and ''The 
sole question was whether this Park wafl within the rxelusive 
jurisdiction of the United States" 23). 'l'he question of 
jurisdiction was therefore a "question of law" (p. 27) rather 
than of fact. as it depended solely ''upon the terms of the 
consent or cession given by the legislature of Georgia,'' of 
858 
which 
had 
discussion in that caRe of the de(·isi<ms in 
supm, 212 U.S. Rodman v. Pothir:r, supra, 264 U.S. 
and lValsh v. Archer, supra, 78 1''.2d 197, 
the court did not intend to the 
by those decisions. 
862, 868.) 
that 
rule established 
supra, 144 F.2d 
Similarly, the Van 221 F. 
was found to " circumstances" in that 
long after 's conviction in the state court of South 
Dakota, the United States Supreme Court had determined 
as a matter of' law, eontrary io the prim· determinatiorlR of the 
courts of Sm1th Dakota and other that Indian 
allotments hdd in trust outside of Indian rpservations had at 
all times been within the mPardng of '' IJ1(1ian '' 
that term was used in the federal statutes. As the said 
at page 971," f T] he recent determination of the her(; 
inYolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
U.S. v. snpra [282 G.S. 442 S.Ct. 58 L.Ed. 
676)], at variance with the rule announced 
Court of the state on his 
constitutes exceptional circumstanc·es, and issn-
ance of the writ .... " It is apparent that the instant case 
involves no such exceptional circumstances as were m 
Bowen v. Johnston, supra, and Ex parte Van 
Contrary to petitioner's claim the cases of In re 
29 Ca1.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24], and In re 29 Cal.2d 
264 [176 P.2d 40], lend no support to his position. Neither 
of these cases involved an attack upon a final of 
conviction but were concerned only with the of 
habitual criminal status. This court the distine-
tion when it said in In t·e Seeley, s1tpra, at page in re-
ferring to the decision in In re -~1cViclcers, supra: "Iu that 
case it was held that an adjudication of habitual criminal 
status is not a judgment of conviction but in effect, an 
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determination of a fact to 
to and hence 
characterized by 
of conviction.'' 
as we have 
claims of la<~k 
similar to those here involved 
d'h"'""·- has contested on the 
due process of law at his trial. 
as appears from the cited 
refused to redetermine ques-
or the locus of the crime on the 
on the face of the trial eourt 
have shown a willingness to look to evidence 
dehors the record where a petitioner has claimed that he has 
been denied his fundamental constitutional rights. (See 
304 U.S. 458 [58 S.CL 1019, 82 I.1.Ed. 1461, 
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct. 
98 A.L.R ; l11oore v. Dempsey, 261 
67 L.Ed. 543]; Frank v. Mangurn, 237 
S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969] ; see also United States 
ex rei. McCann v. 320 U.S. 220 [64 S.Ct. 14, 88 hEel. 
V. 316 u.s. 101 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 
It therefore appears that both reason and authority sup-
the view that no circumstances are presented 
here and that our inquiry in this proceeding is limited to the 
record of the trial court in ·which the final judgments of con-
viction were entered. Having concluded that we may not 
here consider new and additional facts concerning the juris-
diction of the Court of Madera County over the 
offenses of which petitioner was convicted, it follows that peti-
tioner's allegation arP immffieient to entitle him to any relief 
in this 
The writ is discharged and petitioner is remanded to ens-
C. J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.~I dissent. 
The conclusion reached by the majority here is predicated 
upon the assumption that the scope of review on habeas corpus 
in a case such as this is limited to matters appearing upon 
the face of the record and that a reviewing court may not 
f\60 TN RE CARMEN C.2d 
consider facts al1:nndc the record 0ven though such 
facts are conclusively established and it appears beyond doubt 
that the tribunal whose judgment is to review was 
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause and 
render the judgment which is the subject of review in the 
habeas corpus proceeding. In so the majority has 
or misapplied several recent decisions both by this 
court and by the Court of the United States in which 
relief was obtained by means of habeas corpus where the in-
quiry extended beyond the record on which the judgment 
subject to review was based. 
The most recent of these cases is that of Chessman v. Te.ets, 
354 U.S. 156 [77 S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253], decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States on June 10, 1957. 
The background of the Chessman case should be well known 
to every member of this court. It will be remembered that 
on the 21st day of May, 1948, Chessman was found guilty of 
17 felonies by a jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County and on June 25, 1948, sentence of death was pro-
nounced against him. The court reporter who reported the 
proceedings at the trial died after only 646 out of 1,810 pages 
of the trial transcript had been dictated into a recording 
machine. Thereafter the deputy district attorney who prose-
cuted Chessman arranged with one Stanley Fraser who was 
an uncle of the '>Yife of the said deputy district attorney to 
transcribe the remaining notes of the deceased reporter. 'fhe 
purported transcription of these notes extended over several 
months and finally a purported reeord \vas submitted to tlw 
trial court, and in the absence of Chessman or his counsel, 
testimony was offered on behalf of the prosecution with re-
spect to the accuracy of said record which was finally ap-
proved by the trial judge. 'l'he proceedings for the settlement 
of said record were attacked by Chessman before both the 
trial court and this f:ourt, but this court affirmed the order 
of the trial court on May 19, 1950, with two justices dissent-
ing (People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19 
A.L.R.2d 1084]). 'I'hereafter the ease was presented to this 
court on the record so approved and the judgment of death 
pronounced against Chessman was affirmed with the same two 
justices dissenting (People v. Chessman, 38 Cai.2d 166 [238 
P.2d 1001] ). Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of 
the United States was thereafter denied (Chessman v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 915 [72 S.Ct. 650, 96 L.Ed. 1330]). There-
after, and on July 16, 1954, Chessman presented to this court 
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a for a writ of habeas corpus on the that 
he was denied due process of law because of fraud perpetrated 
by the prosecution in the transcription and settlement of said 
alleging in his said petition certain facts which were 
not known to him at the time the other proceedings above 
mentioned were before this court. 'l'his court denied said peti-
tion on 21, 1954, and certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of the United States was later denied without prejudice to 
Chessman applying for a writ of habeas corpus to a federal 
district court (Chessman v. 348 U.S. 864 l75 S.Ct. 
85, 99 r_..Ed. 681] ). He later applied to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California, South-
Prn Division, alleging substantially the same facts which were 
rontained in his application for habeas corpus to the Supreme 
Court of California. This application was summarily denied 
by Judge Goodman of the United States District Court, and 
his decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the 9th Circuit (Chessman v. Teets, 221 F.2d 276). 
The Supreme Court of the United States thereafter reversed 
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and Judge Goodman and 
directed that Chessman be given a hearing on his application 
(Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 [76 S.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4]). 
He was thereafter given a hearing by Judge Goodman who 
denied him any relief and Jndge Goodman's decision was af-
firmed by the United States Conrt of Appeals for the 9th Cir-
cuit, one judge dissenting (Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205). 
Thereafter the Supreme Conrt of the United States granted a 
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the 9th Circuit, and on Jnne 10, 1957, reversed the decision of 
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and ,Tndge Goodman, holding 
squarely that Chessman had been denied dne process of law 
by the proceeding in the trial court which purported to settle 
thr rceord on which this court affirmed his conviction. The 
rffeet of this decision is to render null and void, not only 
,Judge Goodman's decision, but the order of the state trial 
eourt approving the trial record and all of the decisions of 
this court in denying Chessman re1ief. 
In its opinion the Snpreme Court of the United States 
declared: On October 17, 1955, this Court, reversing the 
Court of Appeals, remanded to the District Court for a hear-
ing petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, charg-
ing fraud in the preparation of the state conrt record, which 
had been summarily dismissed by the District Court. 350 
U.S. 3 (76 S.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4J. This resulted in the judg-
ficers c-oncerned 
dispute at the trial, and 
already related to some of that 
tain during the settlement 
"Under the cirnunstanees whieh haYe benn summarized. 
\Ye must holrl that the settlement of this state court 
record violated 
duPe process . ... 
''ln view of our 
<~onrlnded hy the California 
oursdvPs 
hol(l ihat 
thr record on which it acted \Yas as a mattrr of 
state and in any the inaccuracirs then elaimerl 
the 1wtitioner >Yould not have the result of his 
appeal. Petitioner is entitled to have his eorJYiction rrYirwN1 
upon a reeord \Yhich has been settled in aceonia nee with pro-
eednra1 dnr proeess. 11loreovc1·, in as it did tlw sfatr 
conrt u·rts Jloi the lnfrT in b 
Jw.lffl' 
thai those 
Conrt 's d0nials 
9fl LE(1. G1G]; :!11 F 
soo, H5 ILEa. J ; :l4:l n 01 R.n. 
1380] 346 TT.R. 9H5 [74 S.Ct. 278. 98 LEd. 
864 [75 S.Ct. 99 hBd. 6811. do not for('e1ose us from now 
granting appropriate Brown Y. 344 r tf43 
IN RE CARMEN 
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Court 
wurt 
the Su-
United States case it is 
Cour-t considered numerous facts 
both of the trial court and this 
considered the 
uc~•Hv·u arises as to what 
due process.'' There can be no ques-
one of the essential elements of "pro-
u•dural due ' is a tribunal which has the power to hear 
and determine the of the (11 Cal.Jur.2d p. 
§ 313 et seq.), and since ' due process" may 
be established of facts outside of the it must 
follow that a reviewing court may resort to facts 
outside of the record for the purpose of determining whether 
or not the tribulla1 rendering the sought to be re-
viewed had of the subject matter of the litigation. 
TIH•rc ean be no eseape from this conclusion in view of the 
of the Court of the United States 
iu the recent ease of Johnson v. 304 U.S. 458, 41.i5, 
S.Ct. 82 I.~.Eti. 14Gl, 146 A.LR. , where-
iu it was declared: "True, habeas corp1ts cannot be used as a 
means of errors of law and ~n-
the of jurisd£ction-occurring during the 
course of trial; and the 'writ of lwbcas corpus eannot be used 
as a \Yrit of error.' [Woolsey v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2 (57 S.Ct. 
2, 81 LEd. .] These principles, bmvever, must be con-
strued and so as to preserve-Hot destroy~eonstitu-
tional of human life and liberty. The scope of 
in habeas corpus proceedings has been broadened-
not narrowed-since the adoption of the Sixth .Amendment. 
In such a 'it would be clearly erroneous to con-
the to the ancZ .fudgment of the tr·ial 
court' [F'rank v. Mangum, 2i37 U.S. 309, i327 (35 S.Ct. 582, 
59 hE d. l and the court has 'power to inquire 
w£th to !he the either 
864 IN RB CARMEN C.2d 
ma.tter m· to the person, even zf such 
an e:mminaJion outside 
but not inconsistent the record.' 141 
U.S. 116 [11 S.C;i 
131 U.S. 280 [9 S.Ct. has ex-
panded the of a for habeas corpus U.S.C., 
ch. § and the ' ... effeet is to substitute for 
the bare have been the limit of 
under the common-law and under 
the Act of 31 Car. II, c. 2, a more investigation, 
in which the applieant is put npon his oath to set forth the 
truth in the matter respecting the causes of his detention, 
and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to ''dis-
pose of the party as law and justice require." 
'' 'There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress 
to thus liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus 
in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through 
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established 
thereunder, it results that nuder the sections cited a prisoner 
in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of 
crimina] jurisdiction may have a judieial inquiry in a court 
of the United States into the very truth and substanee of the 
eauses of his detention, although it may become necessary 
to look behind and beyond the record his conviction to a 
sufficient extent to test the jun:sdict~:on of the state court to 
proceed to a judgment against him. . . . 
'' ' ... it is open to the courts of the United States upon 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond 
forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter, 
' " (Emphasis added.) Frank v. JJ1angum, 237 U~S. 
309, 327 r35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 9691; Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86 [43 S.Ct. 265, 67 I-l.Ed. 548/; Mooney v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct. 340, 79 hEd. 791, 98 A.hR. 406]; Hans 
Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 rg S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 
118]. The court eonelnded with the statement that "The 
judgment of conviction pronounced by a cotrrt without juris-
diction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain 
release by habeas corptlS. A judge of the United States-to 
whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed-should be 
alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged 
they make the trial absolutely void.' " (Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86, 92 [ 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543] ; Patton v. United 
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 313 [50 S.Ct. 253, 74 hEd. 854, 
70 A.L.R. 263] .) 
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in the case at bar is in direct 
of the 
which was 
must exist be-
record may be habeas 
grounn that the federal district 
to the petitioner for 
murder 'l'he 's allegation was that the federal 
court did not have jurisdiction to him. The United States 
Court held that the requirement that a litigant resort 
procedure ''is not a rule denying the power to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that neverthe-
less the trial court >vas without jurisdiction. '!'he rule is 
not one defining pmver but one which relates to the appro-
exercise of power.'' The court then proceeded to 
elaborate by showing· that the same eircumstances were pres-
ent there that we have in the case at bar. lt was said:" [T]he 
rule is not so inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional 
circumstances where the need for the reme(1y afforded by 
the writ of habeas corpus is apparent. ..Among these excep-
tional circtrm.~tances are those a conflict between 
state and authorities on a question of law involving 
concerns of large importance affecting their respective juris-
" (Emphasis added.) In the Bovven case evidence 
outside the record was apparently considered inasmuch as 
the distriet court which had tried petitioner had given no 
eonsiJeration to the jurisdictional question since as the court 
stated ''The matter stood without any judicial explanation 
and without appeaL" (P. 27.) It therefore clearly appears 
that the so-caHed "exceptional circumstances" present in 
the Bowen case are also present in the rase under coHsidera-
tion. 
In Waley v. Johnston (1942), 316 U.S. 101, 104 [62 S.Ct. 
964, 86 IJ.Ed. 1302], habeas corpus was granted on evidence 
outside the record. The court said: ''The issue here [whether 
petitioner's plea o£ guilty had been coerced] was appropri-
ately raised by the habeas corpus petition. The facts relied 
on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was 
not open to consideration ancl rcv'iew on appeal.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
Tn United States f:J.' rel. liicCann v. Adams (HI4;j), :120 U.K 
48 C.2d~-28 
866 IN RE CARNIEN [48 C.2d 
S.Ct. 14, 88 hEd. 4], habeas corpus was granted 
';;; that be had not waived 
his right to eonnfi('l and a trial. 'l'lw court Haid: "That the 
msne lw wain•d his right to eounsel and trial], 
now tendered the habeas corpus below, 
has never been adjudieated on its merits by the lower courts. 
But it is no ·within the bosom of the trial court. Nor 
can it be disposed of on of his the claim 
rests on rnaterial dehors the trial " (Emphasis 
added.) Once again it is apparent that evidence outside 
the record may be considered on a petition for habeas corpus. 
In illoure v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 87, 90 [ 43 S.Ct. 265, 
G7 L.Ed. 54:l] (de(·.ided in 192:3 and before the Johnson 
case, 304 1J.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 hEd. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 
:!57]) habeas eorpus was granted on evideuce outside the 
record on petitioners' allegation that they had been denied 
due process of law because their convictions of murdering 
a white man had been obtained through mob pressure at a 
trial which lasted three-quarters of an hour. 
In Frank v. ,Mangum (1915), 237 U.S. 309, 326, 331 [35 
S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969], habeas corpus was denied on the 
ground that the state court's prior determination of the 
truth of petitioner's allegations was conclusive. It was held, 
however, that a court of competent jurisdiction was an essen-
tial element of due process; and that while evidence outside 
the record could not be considered at common law, the scope 
of review had been broadened. '['he c-ourt stated: ''There 
being JJO doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus 
liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus in 
order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States against the infringement through 
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established 
thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner 
in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state eourt 
of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a 
court of the United States into the very truth and substance 
of the cause of his detention although it may become neces-
sary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction 
to a suffieient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court 
to proceed to judgment against him." It was also held that 
"In the light, then, of these established rules and prineiples: 
that due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had regard to substance of right, and not to matters of 
form and procedure : that it is open to the courts of the 
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United States npon an 
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the matter . whether 
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for a writ of habeas corpus 
into the very substance 
·in the record or 
As to the <>nrnYnn on the part of the to distinguish 
rights such as that certain specified 
and a convic-
tion under an unconstitutional law, is concerned, it should be 
specifically noted that in the ease of Johnson v. 304 
U.S. 458 S.Ct. 1019, 82 hEd. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357], the 
court emphatically held that the right to counsel was Juris-
dictional, and that when a "jurisdictional question" was 
involved" 'it would be clearly erronrons to eonfine the inquiry 
to the proc.reding~-; and judgment of the trial court.' " 
In the ease of 'l'ooisuah v. Uniterl States, 186 F.2d 93, 
which the majority holds is "not helpful" to Carmen, the 
question of jurisdiction of the federal distriet court had been 
raised at the trial and affirmed on appeal. On a collateral 
attack on the judgment of convietion based on the ground 
that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because the land 
on which the crime had been committed was not "Indian 
country," the court reversed its former decision and remanded 
the cause with direetions to vacate the judgment and dismiss 
the indictment. It was held that "The question is one of law 
whether the agreed and adjudieated facts bring the offense 
within that class over which exelusive federal jurisdiction is 
extended by statute. Since tl1e motion goes squarely to the 
jurisdiction of the court on agreed facts; involves human 
liberties, as well as a possible eonflict between state and 
federal jurisdiction over crimes eommitted within the bound-
aries of a sovereign state; and since the question of Jurisdic-
tion was not presented or painstakingly considered in the 
direct appeal, we deem it appropriate to re-examine it here." 
(Emphasis added.) On the direct appeal from the judgment 
of conviction Carmen, in the case at bar, tried unsuccessfully, 
to raise the question of jurisdiction. A majority of this court 
refused his application but intimated that he might have an-
other remedy. The majority seeks to distinguish the Toosigah 
case on the ground that "no new or additional facts" were 
sought to be injeeted into the ease and "no adjudicated facts 
... sought to be impeadwd." Davis v. Johnston, 144 F.2d 
862, is not like the ease at bar. 'rh<>re the petitioner for a writ 
of habeas corpus had been tried by the federal district eourt 
and that court's jurisdiction had been in issue and directly 
in the lower court and a """"u"' 
In the case at bar the state court assumed 
this court would not the question of lack of 
C.2d 
In Matter 197 U.S. 488 
, the 
of habeas corpus because there was a direct conflict between 
the state and local federal courts on the 
Court in on its in the Neff case 
202 U.S. 178, 183 [26 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed. 
, saicl that the Conrt of .r\ppeals in the Neff ease "had 
deeided the to the contention ol: 
petitioner, so that a writ of error feom that court would hav(• 
ae<•omplished nothing; and , that the maltm· invoi15Pd 
up into 
the .iurisdieUons 
over numbers Indians. There were special reasons, 
therefore, for our issuing a writ of habeas corpus and investi-
gating the matter in that ease." (Emphasis added.) It >vas 
coneluded that it ''ould be '' ms~umed that the trial courts 
will follow the rulings of this and if there be in any 
ease a departure therefrom the proper appellate court will 
correct the error." In Toy 'l'oy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 549 
[29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644], the Supreme Court, quoting from 
Louisville Trust Co. v. Corningor, 184 U.S. 18, 25 S.Ct. 
293, 46 L. Ed. 413], said: "Jurisdiction as to the subject-
matter may be limited in various ways, as to civil and crimi-
nal cases; cases at common law or in equity or in admiralty; 
probate cases, or cases under special statntes; to particular 
classes of persons ; to proceedings in particular modes ; and 
so on. In many cases jurisdiction may depend on the ascer-
tainment of facts involving the merits, and in that sense the 
eonrt exercises jurisdiction in disposing of the in-
quiry, although the result may he that it finds that it c~annot 
go farther. And where, in a ease like th<l t before us, the court 
PrToneously retains jurisdiction to adjndieate the merits, it:;; 
aetion ean he eorreeted on review." (And see United States 
v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 [27 S.Ct. 165, 51 I_~.Ecl. 319] .) 
So far as the rule in this state is eoneerned, T r1ad thought 
it settled by In rc Bell, 19 Ca1.2d 501 [ 122 P.2d 
that a "petitioner seeking habeas rorpnN, ho-vvever, is not 
(•onfined to the faee of the reeord in atten1 to sustain 
the burden of proving that his conviction was in violation 
of his constitutional rights. The courts of both the United 
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of habeas 
corpus an examination not only of the actual evidence 
introduced at petitioner's trial but of any necessary additional 
evidence upon the infringement of petitioner's con-
stitutional v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 
67 L.Ed. v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 S.Ct. 
79 L.Ed. 98 A.L.R. 406]; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 
U.S. 242 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066] ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 
In re Connor, 15 Cal.2d 161 [99 P.2d 248]; In re 
16 Cal.App.2d 709 [61 P.2d 490]; In 1·e Lake, 65 
420 [224 P. 126] In re Chaus, 92 Cal.App. 384 [268 
; see, also, F'·iske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 [ 47 S.Ct. 655, 
71 L.Ed. 1108]; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 [57 S.Ct. 
255, 81 L.Ed. 278]; Nm·ris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 [55 S.Ct. 
79 L.Ed. 1074]; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [53 
S.Ct. 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527] .) This examination is 
made, not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict, but to determine what the verdict actually 
was, so that the court may decide whether it violates constitu-
tional guaranties. Such an examination will be made in a 
habeas corpus proceeding whenever a petitioner has been 
deprived of due process of law, whatever form that deprivation 
has taken." We also said (In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 712, 
713 [108 P.2d 10]) that we had the right, on habeas corpus, 
to into jurisdictional facts whether they appear on 
the face of the record or not and that the scope of the in-
'' embrace additional evidence received by this 
court either directly or under an order of reference. (In 1·e 
Mooney, 10 Cal.2d 1 [73 P.2d 554].)" 
It has been held that jurisdiction of a subject matter over 
which a court has otherwise no jurisdiction cannot be con-
ferred by consent, stipulation (Abalian v. Townsend Social 
Inc., 112 Cal.App.2d 441 [246 P.2d 965] ; Miller v. 
·Miller, 52 CaLApp.2d 443 [126 P.2d 357], agreement (Fletcher 
v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App. 468 [250 P. 195] ), acquiescence 
(Fang Chuck v. Chin Po Foon, 29 Cal.2d 552 [176 P.2d 705] ), 
silence (Tennesen v. Prudential Ins. Co., 8 Cal.App.2d 160 
[47 P.2d 1066]), appearance (Sampsell v. Superior Court, 
32 Cal.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739] ), or estoppel (More Estate, 143 
Cal. 493 P. 407] ). Jurisdiction of the subject matter 
in any proeeeding is eonferred by law, and cannot be given, 
enlarged, or waived by the parties (Harrington v. Superior 
Court, 194 Cal. 185 [228 P. 15]). 'l'his means that where 
there is a want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, a pur-
870 
matt('!' may be raised at any time. ln 14 American 
,Jurisprudence, section the fol-
tribunals havn 110 
mattrr ou vrhid1 as:o;nme to their are 
absolutely void in the strictest sense of the term and a eoul't 
wbich is to deeide on its own jurisdietiou in a 
given case may determine that at any time in the 
proceedings of the eause, \rhenever that fact is made to appear 
to its satisfaetion, either before or after judgment. Accord-
ingly, an objeetiou for want of' jurisdieiion, if it may 
be raised answer or at any subsequent of the pro-
ceedings; in fad, it may be raised for tlw first time on appeaL 
A court will want of jurisdietion over the subject 
matter even if no objection is made. 'f'herefore, 'Whenever a 
want of juri:-:;dietiou is by the court's examination 
of the case or it is the duty of the court to consider 
it, for if the court is without jurisdiction, it is powerless to 
aet in the ease. 
''A plaintiff against whom judgment went in the lower 
t~ourt may on appeal raise the of the jurisdiction of 
the trial court and have the judgment reversed if the court 
did not have jnrisdietion of the subjcet although the 
assmnption of jurisdiction was to his advantage. 
"As heretofore show11, the jurisdiction of a court over the 
subjeet matter of a canse of action may be conferred by law, 
and it eanuot u ncler any eireumstanee be conferred on a court, 
as such, by the consent of the parties. It naturally follows 
that if j urisdietion cannot be conferred by consent, the want 
thereof eannot be waived any aet of the parties.'' 
'fhe same rule appears in 13 California J urispruclenee 2d, 
Courts, seetion 86, page 597: "\Vhere a judieial tribunal has 
uo jurisdiction of the subject matter on whieh it assumes 
to ad, its rn·oeeedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense 
of the term; and a (:ourt, being eompetcut to determine its 
own jurisdictioll, may determine that question at any time 
in the proceedings, whenever that fad is made to appear to 
its satisfaetion, either before or after judgment Aeeordingly, 
an objection for want of such jurisdiction may be raised by 
answer or at any subsequent stage of the proceedings; in fact 
IN RE CARMEN 
!48 C.2d 851; 313 P.2d 8171 
it may be raised for the first time on 
16 CaL 53:1; Creditors v. Consumers' 
[ 33 P. 196] iVI astick v. 
869) In rc, 101 CaL ~:l4D 
People v. Oakland !Vater Pront 
San Sav. Ban!c v. 
'' i'1. <~ourt should 
subjeet matter even if no 
ever a want of j uri~dietion is 
nation of the case m· oth it is the 
871 
consider for if the court is without jurisdietion it is power-
Jrss to act in the ease. So fnn.lamental is the necessity that 
a eourt have jnrisdietion of the matter, that a lar:k 
thereof may be raised on appeal or in another proceeding, 
even by the party who invoked the jurisdiction in the first 
place." (Emphasis add eel.) 
In irlatson Co. v. Uuitcd States, 284 U.S. 352 
[52 S.Ct. 162, 7G hE(!. , a <'Hsr arising nnd0r the .Ad-
miralty Act where exelnsivc jmisdiction was vested in the 
federal courts, the eo art said: ''.As the want of jurisdietion 
is of tbc sn bject matter, it may be eonsic!ered, and appropriate 
judgment given, at any stage of the proceedings, either here 
or below. Hilton v. Dick1:nson, lOS U.R. JG5, 168 [2 S.Ct. 424, 
27 L.Ed. G8S]; Gaines1:ille v. Bl'lnon-Crummcr lnv. Co., 277 
U.S. 54, 5fJ I 48 S.Ct. 72 LEd. 7811. S('(' Orace v. Ameri-
mn Centrol Ins. Co., JO!J U.S. 28:3-281 [:3 S.Ct. 207, 27 
LEd. D32] ; Bars v. Preston, 111 U.S. 255 14 S.Ct. 407, 
28 L.Ed. 419]." 
In Uainesm:lle v. Brown-Crummer lnv. Co., 277 U.S. 54, 
58, 59 [48 S.Ct. 4?54, 72 J~.Bd. 781], the ease had been tried 
and appealed in the federal conris. The ease went up on 
eertiorari to the United States Supreme Court. That court 
said: "Objection is first made by the petitioner that there 
was no separable controversy and so no [federal] jurisdiction. 
This question does not seem to have been presented to and 
was certainly not considered by the Circuit Cmrrt of Appeals." 
(Emphasis added.) After noting that the question of juris-
diction would seem to have been "abandoned until it is now 
renewed in the briefs in this Court,'' the court said: ''Of 
course a question of jurisdiction ean not be waived. Jurisdic-
tion should appear, and the question may be 
raised at any tirnc. Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 
U.S. 278, 283 [3 S.Ct. 207, 27 hEd. fl82] Mansfield, C. &: 
L. JYI. R. Co. v. J 11 U.S. 882 S.Ct. 510, 28 
872 
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Rayna Tom Carmen was found of the first 
murder of ·wilbur Dan McSwain and with assault with intent 
to murder Alvin \Vilbur's brother. On 
this court v. 36 Cal.2d 768 P.2d 
reversed the murder eonvietion and affirmed the conviction 
of assault with intent to eommit murder. 
Tom Carmen was found guilty a jury of first murder 
without reeommcndation. The ;jndg:ment \Vas affirmed this 
eourt in August, J 954 v. 43 Ca1.2d 342 127:) 
P.2d ). 
On appeal, defenclant sought to show by the production 
of additional evidence that both he and the deceased, vVilbur 
Dan MeSwain, were Indians and that the crime oceurred 
in "Indian eonntry." It was, and is, defendant's 
that the above facts vest exelusive jurisdiction in the federal 
courts. In the majority opinion in People v. Cannen, 43 Cal. 
2rl a42, 348 [273 P.2d 521], it was lwld: "We have concluded 
that the proposed offer to produce additional evidence on the 
appeal should be denied. l~'urthermore, even that 
additional evidence could be received on appeal in this cla>~s 
of cases by stipulation or otherwise, the facts stated in the 
so-ealled 'stipulation' as well as shown in the entire record 
are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdidion in the federal 
eourts." It 1vas also said (at page 349) : "The evidence pre-
sented at the trial is not sufficient to a determination 
that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in the present ease, 
and we do not pass on the question of what remedies may be 
available to the defendant to show alleged lack of jurisdiction 
in the state court.'' 
After the filing of the opinion in the above mentioned case 
and a denial of a petition for a rehearing therein, Carmen 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he raised 
the question of lack of jurisdiction in the eourts 
and contended that exclusive jurisdiction was in the federal 
courts. This court issued a writ of habeas corpus returnable 
in San Francisco on December 8, 1954. 
State ex rei. Dtt Fault v. Utecht., 220 Minn. 4al N.W.2d 
706, 161 A.L.R. 1316], is relied upon heavily by the People 
for the proposition that unless the court's lack of jurisdiction 
is clear and undisputable from the face of the record, habeas 
873 
to review an erroneous deter-
it has territorial over an 
for habeas corpus 
writ of error or 
""''u'"'"' features 
and the Utecht case. 
jurisdiction on 
Carmen in the instant case; secondly, while 
the crime was committed ( ac-
upon an Indian allotment for which a 
trust been issued. The crime in the Carmen case 
committed on the ,Jim Allotment but the land 
that time still held in trust by the United States govern-
ment and no fee patent had been issued. (It was issued, subse-
to the in 1952.) 
While it is difficult to ascertain the exact holding in the 
Utecht case, the following statement (page 707) appears to 
that had no fee patent been issued, a different solu-
have been reached: ''The set out in peti-
t he writ of habeas corpus, if true, 
the state courts of ju.risdiction in this matter. 
·u:n,su,·'·"''"'"n does not extend over individual members 
an Indian tribe in so-called 'Indian country.' State v. 
218 Minn. 429 [16 N.W.2d 752] .... 
' 'In the original proceedings before the district court of 
Carlton tlJere is no reference to the fact that the place 
where the crime was committed was within an Indian reserva-
tion on an Indian allotment, and no reference to the fact that 
relator is a member of the Chippewa tribe of Indians and a 
ward of the government, except that at the pre-sentence 
examination relator was asked by the court : 
" 'Let's Ree: Do you belong to the Chippewa tribe: A. 
Yes.' " 
The Utecht case was, apparently, decided on the theory 
that defendant should have brought the court's lack of juris-
diction this is dubious since the crime was com-
mitted on land to which a patent in fee had been issued and 
was, no longer Indian country) to the attention of the 
court on appeaL Utecht did not perfect an appeal. Carmen 
to have the matter determined on appeal. It will be 
recalled that a majority of this court determined ( 43 Cal.2d 
that Carmen's" proposed offer to produce additional evi-
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deuce on the appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even 
that additional evidence eould be reeeived on appeal 
in this claf'is of cases stipulation or otherwise, the facts 
stated in the so-called 'stipulation' as WPll as shown in the 
entire record are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdiction 
in the federal courts. . . . 
''The evidence presented at the trial is not sufficient to 
a determination that there is exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion in the present case, and we do not pass on the question of 
what remedies may be available to the defendant to show 
lack of jurisdiction in the state court. Nothing in 
the record indicates that the location of the crime was 'Indian 
eonntry' within the meaning of any of the statutPs whieh have 
been cited. (See e.g., 18 U.S.O. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242.) 
While there was evidence that defendant and the victim were 
"'-'-"··'-'"•H"'·' the use of this term, without more, shows only that 
the persons were Indians by race and blood.'' (Emphasis 
added.) We know, therefore, that the fact that defendant and 
the decease-d were both Indians appeared on the face of the 
record. 
It is of interest to note that in the courts of the United 
States (see discussion, supra), there may be a judicial inquiry 
into the very truth and substance of the causes of a defendant's 
detention although it may become necessary to look behind 
and beyond the record of his conviction to a sufficient extent 
to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to a judg-
ment against him. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466-468 
[58 S.Ot. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357]; Wong Doo v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 239 [ 44 S.Ot. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999]; 
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 [44 S.Ot. 519, 68 L.Ed. 989].) 
'l'he Utecht case, while factually very similar, has really 
no application to the case at bar. A_ majority of this court 
refused to perrnit Carmen to produce additional evidence on 
appeal on the q7wstion of jurisdiction of the subject rnatter; 
there was no appeal in the Utecht case where that court held 
the question of jurisdiction should have been considered. The 
crime in the Carmen case was committed in Indian country; 
in the Utecht case, a patent in fee had been issued (see the 
various cases cited infra holding that an Indian is emancipated 
when he has received a patent in fee to land; and section 349, 
title 25, U.S.O.A., which provides that when the lands have been 
so eonveyed ''then ead1 and every allottee shall have the bene-
flt of and be subjeet to thE· laws, both (·ivil and eriminal, of the 
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in which they may ") Tn 
lVI:imwso1a there is an appral from the denial of a ticlll for 
a writ of habeas corpus and there may not be successive 
tions for the writ on the same set of facts. Such is not the 
Jaw in California. 
In Stafp, ex rel. Irvine v. District Court, 125 :lVIont. 398 
P.2d 272, , the accused was an Indian. The crime of 
burglary committed on an Indian reservation was involved. 
The Montana court held that it had no jurisdiction in that 
exclusive jurisdiction was in the federal courts; that defend-
ant was an Indian and a ward of the government. It was 
held that the question of jurisdiction "should be inquired into 
by the court at the earliest inception on its own initiative 
to a:-wPrtain whether that rmrtienlar eonrt has jurisdietion of 
that elass of offense. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 758 r8 S.Ct. 
1263, 32 I1.Ed. 274]; Barnes v. Hunter, 10 188 F.2d 
89; Tooisgah v. United States, 10 Cir., 186 F.2d 93, 96. 
"It should be kept in mind that all congressional 
relative to Indians and Indian affairs has been initiated and 
enacted for the benefit of the Indian. As was stated the 
supreme court, 'According to a familiar rule. legislation af-
fecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest, and 
a purpose to make a radical departure is not lightly to be 
inferred.' United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599, 600 [36 
S.Ct. 696, 698, 60 L.Ed. 1192]. 
'' 'The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdic-
tion and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.' 
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 13671." 
It was also held that "Exclusive jurisdiction over the Indian 
for this purpose has always been claimed and asserted by 
the general government, on the ground that the Indian is a 
ward thereof, and dependent thereon, and until fully emanci-
pated and discharged from that condition, Title 25, § 349, 
U.S. C.A., the federal government continues to assert its ex-
l'lHsive jurisdiction to punish its ward for the eommitting 
of the enumerated offenses." 
With the above rules in mind, on May 26, 1955, this court 
made an order of reference propounding certain questions 
to counsel for petitioner Carmen and the attornry general. 
Pursuant to said order, hearings were held and 
taken at Sacramento on December J4, 19;)5. at Madera on 
F1ebruary 20, 1956, aud at San Quentin on F'elH'nary 23. 1956. 
On May 17, 1956, the referee, the Honorable ,John P. lVIcl\Iur-
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ray, 
filed with this court the 
'' 1. Did Tom Carmen and 
to a tribe or tribes of Indians 
and character of the tribal 
"Your Referee finds that Tom 
Dan McSwain did to a tribe of Luuuu1" 
Mono Indians who live in the North 
in this state. 
''The nature and character 
tion to which these men was 
organization which, however, has its O\Yll 
the main tribal feature 
(•eremony upon the 
'rhe tribe is divided into two 
If a the Eagles render certain 
at his funeral and vice versa. The squaws, if a member of the 
family dies, cut their hair short during the funeral. The 
funeral consists in a celebration of several which 
there is a great deal of crying and some 
the funeral ceremony the members of the 
ceased abstain from eating meat or greasy 
four hours and before a second ceremony 
pants in the ceremony wash their faees with a gray odoriferous 
weed which is called 'sorrop' in the Mono 
members of the tribe still weave baskets of distinctive de-
signs and usc the rradleboard of 'hoops' in which to carry 
babies. ThPR(~ erad1Pboards are \YOY011 in such a mannn 
as to allow the sex of the child to be put on the after 
the child is born. The child's sex is indicated a tribal 
pattern, one indieating that the baby is a and the other 
indicating that the baby is a girl. The members fhe tribe 
at times meet in order to raise money to thPir intert>sts 
as Indians. The meetings arc held as a tribal mattPr, but the 
proteetion sought is as California not as Mono 
Indians. They also hold social gatherings several times a year 
which are restricted to the members of the tribes. It is 
tomary for members of the tribe to collect acorns 
ground into flour and meal and are baked bread. 
also eonsider the butterfly worm as a delicate item 
*A of this court now neatly 
Referee on questions propounded by stating 
to discuss the question of whether the evidence is 
the findings. 
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Dan 
Bureau 
was later removed in 
uc.ac1u;.; with Indians listed 
In order to be eligible for enrollment a 
of ancestry which goes back to 1852. 
purpose of this census roll is to determine eligibility 
either of them belonged to a tribe of Indians did 
of them sever tribal relations or become other-
wise from his tribe~ 
"Neither of the named persons ever severed tribal relations 
ber:amc otherwise emancipated from his tribe. 
"4. Had the Department of Indian Affairs acted in any 
way toward defendant Rayna Torn Carmen or the victim of 
the Wilbur Dan McSwain f 
"The of Indian Affairs appeared in the Su-
preme Court informally on behalf of defendant Hayna Tom 
but there is no evidence that it at any time acted 
in way toward the victim of the homicide, Wilbur Dan 
i\IcSwain. 1'he department collected and delivered to Car-
men's mother his distributive share of a judgment obtained 
for certain California Indians at a time after his conviction 
which led to his present incarceration. Rayna Tom Carmen 
also attended the Federal Indian School at Stewart, Nevada, 
near Carson a federally operated Indian school, and 
went to the Sherman Institute, a federally oper-
ated Indian school in Riverside County, California. 
'' 5. To what extent if any did the Department of Indian 
Affairs exercise supervision over the place of abode or manner 
in whieh these parties lived? 
''The Department of Indian Affairs did not exercise any 
over the place of abode or manner of life of 
of the hearings on reference shows, at page 15, that 
Dan name was removed because of his death. His 
death oerurred on April 22, 1950. An amendment was passed on May 
1950 which provided that persons "must be living on the date of 
Act in order to be enrolled." 
C.2d 
either of these but there is testimony that it never 
acts in such manner with any California Indians. 
"6. Had there been any agreement between the United 
States and the tribes to which they belonged 7 
''There had 11ever been any agreement between the United 
States and the tribe to which either of these parties belonged. 
"7. Had either of these parties ever received an allotment 
of laud be(•anse he \\·as an Juc!ian or of Indian clrseent? If RO, 
what if any disposition has been made of such land~ 
"Neither party had ever received any allotment of land 
lweause he was an Indian or of Indian descent. 
110 disposition was ever made of any such land." 
l\Ir. I-1inn, Assistant Attorney General, stipulated at the 
first hearing on reference (page 3 of the transcript) that "the 
Cnited States of Ameriea did, on November 26, 1920, issue an 
allotment to the foregoing deseribed lands [where the crime 
was eommittcd] to Maggie ,Jim, a Mono Indian, that said 
deseribed lands at all times han been and are now* held in 
trust by the United States of America." It was also stipulated 
by counsel that this allotment was not part of, nor had it been 
part of, an Indian reservation. 
'l'he only real question here involved is whether the federal 
government in 1950, the year in which the erime occurred, 
had exclusive jurisdicton over erimes of this type in any case 
involving Indians and Indian eountry. This question is also 
bypassed by a majority of this court because of its holding 
that laek of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record 
in order to entitle a petitioner to its benefits unless unusual 
eircumstanecs appear and that there are no such unusual cir-
eumstanees in the ease at bar. I have heretofore shown that 
this eourt admitted ( 43 Cal.2d 342, 349) that "there was evi-
denee that defendant and the victim were 'Indians,' " and the 
location of the crime was also in evidence at the time of trial 
although it may not have been specifically referred to as 
Indian Country it was referred to as the "Maggie Jim Allot-
ment." I am of the opinion, therefore, that even by adopting 
the restrictive rule of the seope of habeas corpus subscribed 
to by the majority (and whieh, in my view, overrules the 
more liberal and salutary rules of In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488 
r 122 P.2d 22], and In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701 fJ08 P.2d 
10]), Carmen was entitled to have the question of the juris-
* Subsequent to the crime, in IrJ52, ~ fpe patent to this land was 
issued to D2n McSwain, the father of the victim Wilbur Dan Me· 
Swain, and the husband of Maggie Jim. 
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diction of the California court determined. One is 
deprived of a substantial constitutional right when be is 
found guilty, and sentenced by a court having no jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter! 
Defendant argues that the state court was without 
diction in this case and that exdusiye jurisdiction was vested 
in the United States and its courts by reason of sections 1151, 
1152, 1] 53, and 3242 of the United States Code Annotated, m; 
amended May 24, 1949. (U.S.C.A., tit. With this con-
tention I agree. 
Section 1151 provides as follows: ''Except as otherwise 
provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title [those sections 
haYe reference to sales of liquor to Indians and the definition 
of the term 'Indian country' as it relates to the liquor laws], 
the term 'Indian country,' as used in this chapter, means 
all lands within the limits of any Indian reserYation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstand-
ing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way 
running through tl1e reservation, (b) all dependent Indian 
communities within the borders of the United States whether 
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, 
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and 
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinrJ1rished, including rights-of-way running through the 
same." (Emphasis addrd; June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 
757, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 25, 63 Stat. 94.) 
'raking the problem here involved step by step, it has been 
stipulated that the crime was committed on an Indian allot-
ment, the Indian title to which had not been extinguished at 
the time of the crime. The People argue that in order for 
such an allotment to come within the definition of "Indian 
country" it must have been part, at one time, of an Indian 
reserYation. This argument stems from House Report Num-
ber 314. 80th Congress, page 492, wherein it is stated that 
Indian allotments were included in the definition of Indian 
country on the authority of United States v. Pelican, 232 
U.S. 442 [34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676]. In the Pelican case, a 
full blood Indian was murdered on land allotted to one Agnes, 
an Indian. The allotment had formerly been part of the Col-
ville Indian reservation which, with certain exceptions. had 
lwen, by Art of CoJJgress (.Jnl.v 1. 1892, eh. 140. 27 Stat. 62) 
yacated and restored to the public domain. The exc.eptions 
were made by Congress to care for the Indians residing on 
that portion of the reservation. Each Indian was entitled to 
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select 80 acres which was allotted him in 
being held in trust for his benefit for 25 
ferred in fee to him or his heirs. 
lands were inalienable. 
The People's is that because 
were once part of an Indian reservation 
by the court to continue to be Indian 
Court in the Pelican case had held that 
was not Indian within 
The Court reversed. It was said at 
though the lands were allotted in 
held in trust the United States for 25 
use and benefit of the allottee, or his 
period were to be inalienable. That the 
continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of 
for all governmental purposes relating the 
and protection of the Indians, is not open 
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 437 
L.Ed. 532] ; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 
S.Ct. 346, 51 L.Ed. 566] ; Couture v. United 
581 [28 S.Ct. 259, 52 L.Ed. ; United States v. 
215 U.S. 278, 290, 291 [30 S.Ct. 93, 54 I_1.Ed. ; United 
States v. Sutton, 215 U.S. 291 [30 S.Ct. 116, 54 r~.Ed. 
Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co., 221 U.S. 
f31 S.Ct. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738] ; Hallowell v. United 
U.S. 317 [31 S.Ct. 587, 55 L.Ed. 750]; UnUed States v. 
229 U.S. 226, 237 [33 S.Ct. 630, 57 L.Ed. " 
further held (page 449) that ''The lands, 
allotment, undoubtedly formed part of the 
r as a reservation]' still retain during the trust 
tinctively Indian character, being devoted to Indian occu-
pancy under the limitations imposed Federal 
The explicit provision in the act of 1897, as to 
do not regard as pointing a distinction, but rather as em-
phasizing the intent of Congress in out its 
with respect to allotments in severalty where these have been 
accompanied with restrictions upon alienation or 
for trusteeship on the part of the Government. In tl1e 
case, the original reservation was Indian f'f\llnTP<r 
cause it had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians 
as such, under the superintendence of the Government. Don-
nelly v. United States, supra [228 U.S. 243 S.Ct. 57 
L.Ed. 820, Ann. Case. 1913E 710)]. The same c,vuc:nu,L 
in substance, apply to the allotted lands 
IN RE CARMEN 881 
[48 C.2d 851; 313 P.2d 8171 
reservation was diminished, were excepted from the portion 
restored to the public domain. The allottees were permitted 
to a more secure tenure, and provision was made for 
their ultimate ownership without restrictions. But, mean-
the lands remained Indian lands, set apart for Indians 
under governmental care; and we are unable to find ground 
for the conclusion that they became other than Indian country 
through the distribution into separate holdings, the Govern-
ment retaining control. 
"It is said that it is not to be supposed that Congress 
has intended to maintain the Federal jurisdiction over hun-
dreds of allotments scattered through territory other portions 
of which were open to white settlement. But Congress ex-
pressly so provided with respect to offenses committed in 
violation of the act of 1897. Nor does the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States depend upon the size of the particular 
areas which are held for Federal purposes (Criminal Code, 
§ 272). It must be remembered that the fundamental con-
siderat£on is the protection of a dependent people." (Emphasis 
added.) The court continued and after explicitly noting that 
Congress amended the original act to provide "That until the 
issuance of fee-simple patents all allottees to whom trust 
patents shall hereafter be issued shall be subject to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States" (section 349, title 
2;), TT.S.C.A. continues to so providP) said: "We df'em it to 
be clear that Congress had the power thus to continue the 
guardianship of the Government. (Um:ted States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375, 383, 384 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228] ; United 
States v. Celestine, supra; Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. 
Co., supra; HalloweU v. United States, supra; Heckman v. 
United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 [32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820] ; 
Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 683 f32 S.Ct. 769, 56 L.Ed. 
1248]; United States v. Wright, supra; United States v. San-
doval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 [34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 7] ; Perrin v. United 
States, decided this day, post, p. 478 [232 U.S. 478 (34 S.Ct. 
887, 58 L.Ed. 697)]); and these provisions leave no room for 
doubt as to the intent of Congress with respect to the mainte-
nance of the Federal jurisdiction over the allotted lands de-
scribed in the indictment." 
The foregoing quotations from the Pelican case show that 
the case did not stand for the proposition that allotments 
must be carved from Indian reservations before they could be 
considered as falling within the definition of Indian country. 
"It must be remembered that the fundamental consideration 
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is the protection of a dependent '' Section 
25, U.S.C.A. provides for allotments to Indians "not 
upon a reservation, or for whose tribe no reservation has been 
provided by trraty, Act of Congress, or Executive order ... 
and patents shall be issued to them for such lands in the 
manner and with the restrictions as 
and 349." Srctiou 349 provides that ' 
the trust period and when the lands have been 
Indians by patent in as provided in section 
and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be 
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or 
in which they may reside ... Provided That until 
the issuance of fee-simple patents all allottecs to whom trust 
patents shall be issued shall be subject to the exclusive 
diction of the United States .... " (Emphasis added.) It 
clearly appears that neither Congress, nor the Supreme Court 
in the Pelican case, intended that the jurisdiction of the 
United States over land held in allotment should differ de-
pending upon whether that land had once been part of an 
Indian reservation. 
The contrary appears to be true in light of the Pelican 
case. In that case the argument was that because the land 
where the crime occurred was at the time of the crime allotted 
to an Indian rather than still part of a reservation it was 
no longer "Indian country." The court's entire opinion is 
devoted to showing that allotted land, the title to whieh 
was still held in trust by the government, was under the 
exclusive jurisdietion of the government for the protection 
of the Indian enjoying the use and benefit thereof. 
The People rely on United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 533 
[58 S.Ct. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410], for the proposition that a state 
may exereise its criminal jurisdietion over the ''same crimi-
nal act" and that the federal government does not assert 
exclusive jurisdiction in a situation such as we have here. 
In the Me Gowan case the court stated ( p. 536) that the only 
question for determination was whether the Heno Indian 
Colony was Indian country so far as regulation of the sale 
of intoxicants to Indians was concerned. It was held (p. 
537, et seq.) that "The words 'Indian country' have ap-
peared in the statutes relating to Indians for more than a 
century. \V e must consider 'the changes which have taken 
place in our situation, with a view of determining from time 
to time what must be regarded as Indian country where it is 
spoken of in the statutes.' Also, due regard must be given 
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to the fact that from an period of our history, the Gov-
ernment has severe penalties to enforce laws 
the sale of liquor on lands occupied by Indians 
supervision. Indians of the Reno Colony 
been established in homes under the supervision and 
of the United States. 'l'he policy of Congress, 
enforced through the deeisions of this Court, has 
been to the liquor traffic with Indians occupying 
sneh a settlement. This protection is extended by the United 
8tates 'over all Indian communities within its 
whether within its original territory or territory 
subsequently aequired, and whether within or without the 
l·im£/s State.' [Italics added.] 
"The fundamental consideration of both Congress and the 
Department of the Interior in establishing this colony has 
been the protection of a dependent people. Indians in this 
colony have been afforded the same protection by the govern-
ment as that given Indians in other settlements known as 
'reservations.' Congress a.lone has the right to determine the 
manner in whieh this country's guardianship over the Indians 
shall be carried out, and it 1:s immaterial whether Congress 
designates a settlement as a 'reservation' or 'colony.' In the 
ease of United States v. Pelican, 2:32 U.S. 442, 449 [:34 S.Ct. 
;)\)(), [)8 LEd. 67G], this Court said: 
" 'In the present ease the original reservation was Indian 
country because 'it had been validly set apart for the 
11se of the Indians as such, nnder the superintendence of the 
Government.' [Italics added.] 
'' rrhe Reno Colony has been validly set apart for the use 
of the Indians. It is under the superintendence of the Govern-
ment. 'l'he Govemment retains title to the lands which it 
permits the Indians to occupy. The Government has authority 
to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this terri-
tory. ' ... Congress possesses the broad power of legislating 
for the protection of the InclianR wherever they may be within 
the territory of the United States ... ' United States v. 
Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467,471 [46 S.Ct. 559,70 hEd.10:39]. 
"When \Ve view the facts of this case in the light of the 
relationship which has long existed brtween the Government 
ami the Indians-and which continues to date-1:t is not rea-
sonably poss£ule to draw any distinction between this Indian 
'colony' anrl 'Indian country.' vVe conclude that section 247 
of Title 25, sttpra, does apply to the Reno Colony. 
''The federal prohibition against taking intoxicants into 
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this Indian colony does not deprive the State of Nevada of its 
sovereignty over the area in question. The J3'ederal Govern-
ment does not assert exclusive jurisdiction within the colony. 
Enactments of the Federal Government passed to protect and 
guard its Ind,ian war·ds only affect the operation, within the 
colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal enact-
ments." (Emphasis added.) 
It should be noted that the McGowan case does not even 
consider whether or not the "Colony" was once part of an 
Indian reservation. It is specifically stated that the Colony 
consists of approximately 28 acres of land, title to which was 
in the United States, and that the colony was created to 
provide homes for needy Indians. 
It follows, therefore, that title to the land here involved, 
known as the Maggie Jim A.llotmant, was still held in trust 
by the United States government at the time the crime was 
committed and that it falls within the statutory definition 
of "Indian country." (U.S.C.A.. title 18, § 1151.) 
Section 1152 [U.S.C.A.., title 18] provides: "Laws govern-
ing. 
''Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general 
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses com-
mitted in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction 
of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall 
extend to the Indian country. 
"This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one 
Indian against the person or property of another Indian, 
nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian 
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, 
or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive 
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the 
Indian tribes respectively.'' 
Section 1153 provides in pertinent part: "Offenses com-
mitted within Indian country. 
''Any Indian who commits against the person or property 
of another Indian or other person any of the following of-
fenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault 
with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country, 
shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other 
persons committing any of the above offenses, within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." (The second 
paragraph of this section relates to rape; the third paragraph 
to burglary. Both provide that the crimes shall be defined 
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as provided by the laws of the state in which they are com-
mitted. Burglary is to be punished in accordance with the 
laws of the state in which it is committed.) (June 25, 1948, 
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 758, amended May 24, ;949, ch. 139, § 26, 63 
Stat. 94.) (Emphasis added.) 
Section 3242 provides that: "All Indians committing any 
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, 
incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny on and within 
the Indian country, shall be tried in the same courts, and in 
the same manner, as are all other persons committing any of 
the above crimes within the exclusit f' jurisdiction of the 
United States." (Emphasis added; ,June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 
62 Stat. 827, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §51, 63 Stat. 96.) 
As hereinbefore set forth, the referee found that both 
petitioner and the victim, Wilbur Dan McSwain, were Mono 
Indians and that both were listed as such on the census roll 
of Indians of California kept by the United States Depart-
ment of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
The People argue that an Indian who has become emanci-
pated in some manner from his tribe is to be treated as a 
non-Indian for the purpose of jurisdiction in a case such as 
this, and there are cases so holding. In Eugene Sol Louie v. 
United States, 274 F. 47, the emancipation of the Indian 
took place when he received a patent in fee to land; *in People 
Y. Ketchum, 73 Cal. 635 [15 P. 353], the defendant was held 
not to be a member of any Indian tribe; in State v. Bush, 195 
Minn. 413 [263 N.W. 300], the defendant Indian held land 
by a patent in fee; *in State v. Jionroe, 83 Mont. 556 [274 
P. 840], defendant Indian held land by a patent in fee; *in 
People ex rel. Schuyler v. Livingstone, 123 Misc. 605 [205 
N.Y.S. 888], defendant was an Indian, but not a member 
of any tribe; in State v. Nimrod, 30 S.D. 239 [138 N.W. 377], 
defendant was an Indian and held land by patent in fee under 
the Dawes Act; *in State v. Howard, 33 Wash. 250 [74 P. 
382], the defendant was an Indian but not a member of any 
tribe. In the case under consideration, neither the defendant 
Carmen, nor the deceased McSwain, had ever received a patent 
in fee from the government or hacl been otherwise emanci-
pated in any way. 
Despite the specific finding of the referee that neither of 
the two Indians involved had ever been emancipated or had 
o-;everecl tribal relations from the tribe to which they be-
*See section 349, Title 25, U.S.C.A., heretofore quoted. 
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longed, the People argue that " 
Indians; that nc·ither of them was en'r eout rolled in any way 
by the Bureau of Indian Affain-; or by the Indian 
tion. It is contended that both Carmen and the deceased 
McSwain were free to do as they pleased without interfer-
ence from either the federal goyernment or by an Indian 
agent. The referee specifieally pointed out that the 
ment of Indian Affairs does not exereise 
any California Indians. These of the 
without merit in view of the referee's findings and the evi-
dence supporting them. The record also shows that the Mono 
Indians (including Carmen and McSwain) lived in "tribal 
vmys"; that they have a "chief"; and that have "meet-
ings once in a while of their own" that the burial service is 
referred to as a "powwow" (Transcript on pp. 
46, 47). 
The People also contend that the case of United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228], with its 
wardship theory, is obsolete. From this it is that 
because Indians are now citizens of the United States and 
of the state in which they reside tit. 8, § 1401 
[formerly tit. 8, §§ 601, 604]; Anderson v. 1J1athews, 174 Cal. 
537 [163 P. 902] ; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 
664 [226 P. 926]) they should be subject to the laws of the 
state in which they reside. It is said, with merit, that Con-
gress itself has recognized the change in the condition of 
the California Indian in that it has expressly stated that 
California has jurisdiction over crimes by Indians in Indian 
country within the state. Publie Law 280 was passed by the 
first session of the 83rd Congress, 1953, giving to California 
jurisdiction in such situations. The fact remains, however, 
that at the time the crime in question was Congress 
had not seen fit to so act. 
'l'he statutes here involved, which in my opinion provide 
for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court in cases such 
as this, have a background of wisdom and foresight. Those 
conversant with the early history of the western states will 
recall the bitter conflicts bet>Yeen the native Indians and the 
white immigrants who first settled these states. As a result 
of the bitterness engendered by these struggles a strong feel~ 
ing of prejudice existed against the remaining Indian popu-
lation after the white man beeame master ol' the western 
domain and established an organized system of government 
therein. The early history of California is replete with in-
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stances in whieh native Indians were denied redress in our 
r·ourts beeanse of this prejudice. A,; a result of this situa-
whieh i,; well known to those whose memories go baek 
two or thr·ce the federal government saw fit, in 
the administration of its wardship over the remaining Indian 
population, to that the federal eourts should have 
exclusive jurisdiction in cases such as this and thereby re-
moved the Jndian from whatever disadvantage he might have 
being prosecuted in state courts in an area where prejudice 
""''"""'~" the Indian might still exist. These statutes remained 
m effect so far as California is concerned until 1953 which 
was long after the commission of the erime here involved. 
It appears from the foregoing that since defendant Rayna 
'l'om Carmen and the victim, ·wilbur Dan McSwain, were 
unemandpated Mono Indians and that the Maggie Jim Allot-
ment on whieh the crime occurred was Indian country, the 
Superior Court in and for the County of Madera, State of 
California, ·was without jurisdiction to try defendant Rayna 
Tom Carmen for the erimes with which he was charged. 
For the foregoing reasons the prisoner should be discharged. 
'l'RAYNOH, Concurring and Dissenting.-! coneur in the 
holding of the court insofar as it constitutes a rule of decision 
for the disposition of cases arising in the future. It is clear, 
however, from the authorities cited in both the majority and 
the dissenting opinion that the question of the availability of 
habeas corpus to attack subject matter jurisdiction by proof 
of facts outside the record has been clouded in uncertainty 
ill tbi,., state. (Sl'P also Edmollds, .T., r·o1wnrring, In rc Bell, 
19 Cal.2d 488, 506-507 [122 P.2d 22) ; In re Wyatt, 114 CaL 
App. 557, 562 [300 P. 132]; 1 Witkin, California Procedure, 
Jurisdiction, § 162, pp. 429-430.) The United States Supreme 
Court appears to have recognized a similar uneertainty with 
respect to the federal rule. (See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 
791 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367].) In Phelan v. Superior 
Court, 35 Cal.2d 363 [217 P .2d 951], this court considered 
the effeet of uneertainty in the law as to the adequaey of the 
remedy by appeal on the right to attaek an order of the trial 
eourt by writ of mandate. It stated: "In view of the un-
certainty which has existed in the law with respect to the 
appealability of the order in question and also in view of the 
holdings of this court that an appeal is not adequate in a case 
of this type, petitioner should not be denied the use of the 
writ because of his failure to appeal. It would obviously 
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be a hardship upon a litigant who has been misled by such un-
certainty in the law if we were to resolve the 
and in the same proceeding deny his petition for a writ on the 
ground that he in fact did have an adequate remedy by ap-
peal." (35 Cal.2d at 371-372; see also In re B'ine, 47 Cal.2d 
814, 818 [306 P.2d 445].) Similarly, the uncertainty that 
has existed as to the availability of the writ of habeas corpus 
to attack the jurisdiction of the trial court in a case of this 
sort should preclude holding concurrently with the resolution 
of that uncertainty that such an attack can only be made in 
the trial court, at least when, as in this case, petitioner's at-
tempt to raise the issue on appeal makes clear that he has 
not sought to abuse the remedy by delaying the attack until 
conviction in the federal courts would become difficult or 
impossible. 
I concur in the conclusion of Justice Carter that the evi-
dence taken before the referee establishes that the Superior 
Court in and for the County of Madera, State of California, 
was without jurisdiction to try petitioner for the crimes with 
which he was charged, and accordingly, I would discharge the 
prisoner. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Notwithstanding the long con-
tinued contest in the litigation before us it appears to me 
that there is no real basis for debate on the controlling issue. 
If we had a record disclosing a substantial conflict in evidence 
as to the facts upon which state jurisdiction depends then 
the majority conclusion would be tenable. But we have no 
such record. 
Upon the facts shown, the Constitution (art. VI, § 2) and 
laws (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, 3242) of the 
United States operate to vest exclusive jurisdiction of the 
subject matter of this case-the penal responsibility of the 
petitioner for the act allegedly constituting the crime for 
which he was tried and convicted-in the courts of the United 
States. Jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action is 
vested in, or prohibited to, a court by the Constitution, federal 
or state, and as may be defined or implemented by statutes 
which do not transgress constitutional limits. (See Harring-
ton v. Superior Court (1924), 194 Cal. 185, 188 [2] [228 
P. 15] ["Jurisdiction in any proceeding is conferred by law; 
that is, by the constitution or by statutP "].) Jurisdiction of 
the subject matter exists by law or it does not exist and can-
not be acquired. (See Schlyen v. Schlyen (1954), 43 Cal.2d 
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(43 C.2d 851; 313 P.2d 8171 
P.2d 897] ; Taylor v. (1923), 192 
[6] [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074] ["Neither a 
party, nor both parties, can vest a court with jurisdiction to 
which it is a stranger"]; King v. Kutner-Goldstein Co. (1901), 
135 Cal. 67 [67 P. 10]; Costa v. Banta (1950), 98 CaL 
App.2d 182 [2] (219 P.2d 478]; Higgins v. Coyne (1946 , 
75 69, 70 [1] [170 P.2d 25]; Glass v. Bank 
America etc. Assn. (1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 645, 647 [3] [62 
P.2d ; Mannix v. Superior Court (1933), 133 Cal.App. 
740, 743 [24 P.2d 507] ["A court cannot, by presuming 
to act, invest itself with jurisdiction") " [ J] udicial duty 
is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdic-
tion [or, here, jurisdiction which the Congress has declared 
is in the federal courts] than in exercising firmly that which 
the Constitution and the laws confer." (Ex parte McCardle 
(1868), 7 Wall. (U.S.) 506, 515 [19 L.Ed. 264].) 
Since by force of federal law jurisdiction over petitioner's 
act and his penal responsibility therefor is vested in the fed-
eral courts and therefore prohibited to California the peti-
tioner is entitled to discharge from state custody. 
